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Non-technical Summary
There is an ongoing discussion about monetary policy in a monetary union when the
countries forming this union are heterogenous with respect to their economic development.
Because of the heterogeneity, individual countries might prefer a monetary policy that is
different from the common monetary policy. The Governing Council, which is the decision-
making body of the European Central Bank (ECB), consists of the national central banks
governors. Because the representatives of national central banks might be looking at the
economic situations in their countries of origin when taking their decision, country-specific
factors may influence interest rate decisions of the ECB. In contrast to this view, however,
the Statute of the ECB demands that monetary policy decisions are made only in view
of the situation of the euro area as a whole.
The basic question concerning the individual decision-making behaviour of the members
of the ECB Governing Council is how much the economic situation of the member states
influences the interest rate decision of the Council. To investigate this question, we
estimate Taylor-type reaction functions for the period from 1999 to 2005 and include
country-specific variables of the euro zone member states. These country specific variables
include inflation rates and economic sentiment indicators. Additionally, we construct time
series containing the minimum and maximum values of inflation and economic sentiment
in the euro area to capture extreme economic developments.
We do not detect a dominant influence of specific countries of the monetary union. More-
over, the results support the view that the decisions of the ECB are taken with respect
to the developments in the whole euro area, and not with respect to selected countries.
However, an influence can be detected for the dispersion of the developments measured
by the maximum inflation and minimum economic sentiment values.
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Abstract
The discussion about country-specific influence on the interest rate de-
cisions of the European Central Bank does not cease. To investigate the
possibility of regional influence on the determination of the policy rate, we
estimate Taylor-type reaction functions for the period from 1999 to 2005 and
include country-specific variables of the euro zone member states. We do
not find convincing evidence that country-specific economic developments
influence the decisions of the ECB Governing Council. However, the maxi-
mum inflation rate and the minimum economic sentiment of the euro area
seem to have an effect on the decisions.
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1 Introduction
Analysis of the monetary policy framework of the European Central Bank (ECB) often
returns to the question regarding whether the differences in the economic situations of the
European Monetary Union (EMU) members have significant effects on the ECB monetary
policy decisions. The ECB conducts a uniform monetary policy for heterogenous economic
regions. However, this is not a unique problem of the ECB. National central banks also
have to deal with differing economic developments in the regions within their countries.
Furthermore, in national central banks like the Fed or formerly the Bundesbank, the
members of the decision-making body also originate from different regions of the country
and can be seen as their representatives. The main difference between national central
banks and the ECB is that the regions of the EMU are nation-states and, therefore,
have a political status that is different from that of regions within a single country. This
strengthens the opinion that no single country should have enough influence on monetary
policy decisions in the EMU to be able to affect the votes of the Governing Council in its
favour.
With the independence of the ECB, it should be guaranteed that the members of the
Council only take the EMU average into account when they determine the policy rate.
However, as discussions in the literature show, this fact is not necessarily trusted, e.g.
Berger and de Haan (2002), Dixit (2000), or De Grauwe et al. (1999). There is even
indication that regional differences indeed influence the interest decisions of the ECB
(Heinemann and Hu¨fner 2004). The suspicion of prevailing national interests in the voting
behaviour of the Council is reinforced by the insufficient transparency of the decision-
making process. First, the ECB refuses to publish the minutes of the meetings leading to
the interest rate decisions and does not provide the voting record even after a considerable
delay, although there are some good reasons for a certain amount of secrecy. One is to
protect the governors of the national central banks from political influence. If the voting
behaviour could be addressed, the governors may become vulnerable to political demands
from their countries of origin. Moreover, this could lead to anticipatory obedience of
the governors. Second, the treaty establishes that the decisions of the Council should be
taken with simple majority, but with no publication of the voting behaviour it is also
possible that a decision is also reached by consensus. Even if one accepts the need for
intransparency to protect the governors from political influence, there is no opportunity
to control coalition formation or other concessions in the decision process.
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The possibility of the representation of national interests in the Governing Council would
not be a subject if the economic situations and economic prospects of the member states
would be more or less similar. This would most probably generate concurrent interest rate
decisions of the governors or, at least, very similar ones. However, economic development
differs across present and potential EMU countries. On the one hand, the ECB continu-
ously stresses the point that the differences in inflation rates and in the developments of
other economic variables do not play a role in interest rate decisions. On the other hand,
the differences between the economic and political weights of the national central bank
governors in the ECB Council are extensively discussed, especially with respect to the
reform of ECB decision-making with the enlargement of the European Monetary Union
(see e.g. Bofinger 2003, de la Dehesa 2003, Gros 2003, Horn 2003, Wyplosz 2003)).
With the future enlargement of the EMU, the economic heterogeneity of the currency area
will increase. Admittedly, the ten future EMU members are small with respect to their
economic weight (6 percent of the euro area’s GDP) but will provide 25 percent of the pop-
ulation. Even with the rotation scheme, which will be introduced to change the process
of decision-making of the Governing Council, the political weight of the potential mem-
ber states will exceed their economic weight by far (Berger, de Haan, and Inklaar 2003).
Therefore, the possibility of regional influence on monetary decision-making is even more
relevant than in the EMU with twelve member states. In addition, the economic de-
velopment of the prospective EMU members differs systematically from the situation in
the new member states. All countries are transition economies undergoing a convergence
process to reach the welfare level of the EMU-12. Because these countries do not im-
mediately accede to the monetary union, their economies should be more similar when
the time comes to join the present members. The similarity in economic development is
assessed for Slovenia that joins the EMU in January 2007. However, even if the accession
will not take place until 2010, the convergence process will not be concluded, and consid-
erably more time will be needed to reach the welfare level of the poorest OECD countries
(Fischer et al. 1998a; Fischer et al. 1998b). New member states will perhaps still need
a more expansive monetary policy at that time than old member states, but will not
have the necessary influence because of their low economic weight in the determination
of EMU variables. This could lead to a biased decision-making process, performed by the
national central bank governors to even out this “disadvantage”. Moreover, the potential
members do not have a long history of independent central banking, which in turn could
influence the behaviour of the decision-makers in two opposite ways. First, the new ECB
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central bankers could behave especially tough to prove their ability of conservative central
banking. Second, the new central bankers could pursue a loose monetary policy because
of a potential pattern of behaviour to support fiscal policy.
The basic question concerning the individual decision-making behaviour of the members
of the Governing Council of the ECB is described as how much the economic situation of
the member states influences the interest rate decision of the Council. This question arises
whether we look at the present or the future enlarged EMU. We address this question by
including country-specific variables from the twelve present EMU members into an ordered
probit estimation of a Taylor-type rule for the ECB from January 1999 to December 2005.
These country-specific variables include inflation rates and economic sentiment indicators.
Naturally, we cannot analyse the influence of future EMU members in this way. But, if
we find a systematic regional influence, we can compare this situation with the likely
future situation in the EMU and draw careful conclusions with respect to the influence of
different regional economic developments in ECB decision-making.
We do not find a convincing country-specific influence on the interest rate decisions of the
ECB. However, the extreme economic developments in the euro area, measured with the
minimum economic sentiment indicator as well as the maximum inflation rate, compared
to the euro area average seem to influence the monetary policy decisions. Therefore, it
does not seem very likely that individual future EMU member states will contort the
interest rate decisions of the ECB. However, this does not preclude that the new member
states as a whole would influence the decisions if these countries provide the minimum
and maximum inflation rates and economic sentiment of the then enlarged euro area.
In the following section, we resume the basic story of potential regional influences on the
interest rate decision of the ECB Governing Council. These reflections are translated into
an extension of the Taylor rule. After introducing the estimation approach and describing
the data used, we show the estimation results. These results are used to make predictions
about the influence of the potential EMU members in the conclusion.
2 Basic Story
The regional differences of the euro area have attracted a lot of attention with regard to
monetary policy. The ECB’s main goal is to achieve price level stability for the euro area
as a whole (Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 105 (1)). In doing so,
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the central bank is faced with different economic situations in the member states of the
monetary union. This heterogeneity will increase if the potential members states join the
monetary union, even if a certain degree of convergence will be reached when the time
comes to join the EMU (see Figure 1). As the figure shows, the potential EMU members
have a high real growth rate as well as a high inflation rate, whereas the present EMU
members have rather low values for inflation and growth.
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Figure 1: Scatter plot for inflation and GDP growth in 2005. Source: Eurostat Structural
Indicators: growth rate of GDP at constant prices (base year 1996) - percentage change on
previous year and the annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices.
One can argue that this situation is not different from the situation of a national central
bank facing different regional developments. However, now the regions are bigger and
tend to be easily identifiable because of their characteristic as nation-states. The more
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divergent the economic development in these countries, the more difficult it is to find
a compromise in decisions about the interest rate, provided that regional development
matters. The task will not get easier when the enlargement of the EMU takes place,
even if a new voting scheme is introduced. Although the number of votes is restricted,
every governor will be allowed to contribute to the discussion to prepare the interest rate
decision. What adds to the difficulties is that the convergence process in the EMU has
come to a halt, and the divergences seem to prevail, as research indicates (e.g. Michaelis
and Minich 2004, Duarte 2003 or Honohan and Lane 2003).
On one hand, the economic development in the member countries is rather different, while
on the other hand, the ECB always stresses the point that interest rate decisions are taken
according to an area-wide view on economic development:
“The ECB exclusively takes a euro area-wide perspective. So, in the prepa-
ration of its decisions, it takes a euro area-wide perspective and there is no
question that monetary policy will be decided along considerations of national
or regional interests, [...]. Monetary policy is one and indivisible for the euro
area as a whole. There does not exist any regional monetary policy.” (Willem
F. Duisenberg, Frankfurt am Main, 1 March 2001)
If this statement is valid, there should be no detectable country-specific influence on the
interest rate decisions of the Governing Council. Furthermore, one could also expect
that the addition of more governors on the Council would not significantly change its
decision-making behaviour.
Aside from the influence of country-specific economic developments, there are presumably
differences in the reaction of the Council members regarding the relevant variables. The
member countries of the monetary union follow a different tradition when it comes to
monetary policy making. There are countries like Germany, which have played a major
role in the European monetary policy until the formation of the monetary union. Coun-
tries like the Netherlands or Austria followed the German interest decisions. But there
are even more fundamental differences, such as the status of the central bank. While
the German Bundesbank was very independent in its interest rate decisions, France and
the UK both had more dependent central banks. It was not until the introduction of
the monetary union, that France made its central bank independent and the Bank of
England was made operationally independent in 1997. Besides independence, the ques-
tion of centralisation of power may also play an important role in EMU monetary policy
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(de Jong 2004). With the introduction of the EMU and the necessity of independent
national central banks, it is assumed that the differences in monetary policy making will
disappear. But change of customs is a lengthy process that can not be completed within
the six years of EMU existence. Additionally, new member states will join the union,
introducing new traditions of monetary policy-making.
It does not seem possible to disentangle both effects, which are the influence of regional
developments and the difference in the reaction of the Council members to the relevant
economic developments. One possibility to investigate the influence of national divergence
on interest rate policy of the ECB is to analyse different forms of the policy reaction
function, taking into account aggregate euro zone data, national data represented by the
median, and a combination of both as done by Heinemann and Hu¨fner (2004). They
come to the conclusion that the ECB Council members take the divergent economic
situation in Europe into account, although more pronounced for inflation than for output.
Carstensen (2006) also employs the median as well as the average of German, French and
Italian variables to detect country-specific influences. As his results show, there might
be country-specific influences present in the ECB decisions. Ruth (2004) also looks for
country-specific influences on the basis of a panel estimation. The forecasting properties
of the ECB reaction function improves if the heterogeneity of the countries before the
monetary union are taken into consideration. Berger and de Haan (2002) investigate the
behaviour of the Deutsche Bundesbank as the role model for the ECB and discover that
the economic situations in the different states influence voting behaviour. The application
to the ECB, given the different economic performances and preferences, leads to the view
that there is a risk that national divergences predominate EMU-wide considerations. The
authors employ interest rate behaviour with respect to inflation and real GDP growth
differences between regional inflation and inflation average and a latent variable approach
to estimate the conservativeness of the ECB central bankers.
In the following, we rely on the approach of estimating monetary reaction functions and
influences of country-specific conditions on the interest rate decisions in the Governing
Council of the ECB, using Taylor-type rules. But instead of relying our analysis on an
assumption regarding voting behaviour as in Heinemann and Hu¨fner (2004), we specify
the country-specific influence directly, as outlined in the following paragraph.
6
3 The Model
We assume that the interest rate of the euro area, aimed in the decisions of the ECB
Council, is a weighted average of the interest rates preferred by the governors, i∗j , and
the board, i∗bd, where the weighting is done according to the parameter a, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
The interest rates the governors pursue, i∗j , are aggregated according to the respective
political weights, bj, that the governors possess in the decision making process. This
weight reflects the possibility that a governor can influence the interest rate decisions in
its preferred direction. Therefore, we can write the interest rate of the euro area as the
outcome of the Council decision as follows:
i∗ = a
∑
j
bji
∗
j + (1− a)i∗bd. (1)
We base our analysis on a standard assumption of central bank monetary policy. The
central bankers choose the short-term interest rate to minimise the loss. The bank incurs
a loss if the inflation rate differs from its target. Additionally, a loss arises if there is a gap
between actual and potential levels of output. Therefore, we assume that the governors
and the board decide the interest rate according to the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). The
Taylor interest rate depends on the inflation rate, π, and on the output gap, y¯. We
assume that the constant includes the inflation target, as well as the real interest rate.
The coefficients of the inflation rates and output gaps incorporate the preferences of the
central bankers regarding the inflation and the output gap. We assume that a governor
does not react differently to the inflation rate of the euro area and the country-specific
value, βj. The same goes for the output gap, γj. One has to be aware of the fact
that the parameters β and γ incorporate the preferences of a central banker regarding
inflation and output gap, as well as the structural parameters of the economy. Therefore, it
could be a restrictive assumption that the reaction to country-specific and euro-wide gaps
should be the same. However, the euro-wide variables are aggregated from the country-
level measures. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the reaction function of a
governor has the same coefficient for the country-specific gap as for the euro-wide gap.
The same mechanism applies to the output gap, because the euro area inflation rate
and output gap do not develop independently, but are based on the developments in the
member states. The assumption gets support by empirical evidence. If we cancel the
restriction on the parameters, the estimation results do not change in an important way.
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The board members behave as an entity and have the same preferences with regard to
inflation and output gap, βbd and γbd. Therefore, the differences between the behaviours of
the decision makers are given by the variables they take into consideration. The governors
look at country-specific inflation rates, πj, and output gaps, y¯j, as well as at the respective
euro area variables, π and y¯. The interest rate a governor wants to see as the outcome of
the decision is a weighted average of both rates. The weighting is done according to cj,
0 < cj < 1. The board is assumed to decide according to euro area variables only. The
desired interest rates of a governor and the board are, therefore, given by the following
two equations:
i∗j = cj(αj + βjπj + γj y¯j) + (1− cj)(αj + βjπ + γj y¯), (2)
i∗bd = αbd + βbdπ + γbdy¯, (3)
Inserting equation (2) and (3) into equation (1), we get the following equation for the
euro area interest rate
i∗ = a
∑
j
bj[cj(αj + βjπj + γj y¯j) + (1− cj)(αj + βjπ + γj y¯)]
+(1− a)(αbd + βbdπ + γbdy¯)
= a
∑
j
bjαj + (1− a)αbd + a
∑
j
bjcj[βj(πj − π) + γj(y¯j − y¯)]
+
[
a
∑
j
bjβj + (1− a)βbd
]
π +
[
a
∑
j
bjγj + γbd
]
y¯.
The area wide variables influence the interest rate according to the aggregated influence of
the board and the governors, [a
∑
bjβj+(1−a)βbd] for the inflation rate and [a
∑
bjγj+γbd]
for the output gap. The country-specific variables have an influence on the interest rate
if they differ from the EMU average, and if a governor can carry through her idea that
the country-specific variable should be considered when making decisions.
4 Estimation Approach and Description of the Data
To analyse these hypothesis empirically, we base our analysis on an ordered probit esti-
mation of a Taylor-type rule. We encode the interest rate decision of the ECB into three
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groups, where the Governing Council leaves the policy rate unchanged, rises the target
rate, or lowers it. This is done with the help of a dummy variable where
ct = 0 if Δit < 0
ct = 1 if Δit = 0
ct = 2 if Δit > 0.
A decision about the change of the policy rate is taken if the difference between the
actual policy rate last period and the underlying target value exceeds a certain threshold
in absolute terms, μj, j = 1, 2. The two thresholds generate an inactive zone, where no
policy rate response is observable. The basis is the optimal interest rate of the central
bank, i∗. We only consider three possible outcomes:
ct = 0 if i
∗
t − it−1 ≤ μ1,
ct = 1 if μ1 < i
∗
t − it−1 < μ2,
ct = 2 if μ2 ≤ i∗t − it−1.
We do not distinguish between interest rate steps of 0.25 or 0.5 percentage points, because
we are interested only in the direction, and not the size of the rate change. To describe
the unobserved interest rate change, we rely on the explanatory variables usually included
in Taylor-type rules. This would be the inflation rate, π, the output gap, or a related
measure, y¯. Besides the standard variables, we include money growth, Δm, because one
pillar of the ECB strategy refers explicitly to the monetary conditions in the economy.
Additionally, an exchange rate variable may play a role in open economies, because the
central bank should target “long-run inflation” – a measure of inflation adjusted to remove
effects of exchange rate movements (Ball 2000). We consider the growth rate of the
real exchange rate, Δe. With xj we denote further explanatory variables capturing the
country-specific influences, like individual inflation rates and output gap measures. The
unobserved optimal interest rate level, i∗t , is then determined by the following equation
i∗t = ρit−1
+ (1− ρ)
(
α + βπt−1 + γy¯t−1 + δΔmt−1 + θΔet−1 +
∑
j
ηjxi,t−1
)
(4)
where 0 < ρ < 1. Since we are interested in the desired change of the policy rate, equation
(4) changes to
i∗t − it−1 = −(1− ρ)it−1
+(1− ρ)(α + βπt−1 + γy¯t−1 + δΔmt−1 + θΔet−1 +
∑
j
ηjxi,t−1
+ϑΔit−1, (5)
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where we add the lagged change of the policy rate, Δi, as an explanatory variable to
capture the short term dynamics of the interest rate, as suggested by Judd and Rudebusch
(1998). An economic reason is to capture interest rate smoothing. There are different
explanations for this special behaviour of central banks (Goodfriend 1991). One possibility
is that a central bank is averse to large interest rate movements.
Equation (5) gives the basis for the ordered probit estimation for the respective currency
areas and basically follows the specification of Gerlach (2004), but we extend the estima-
tion by adding an exchange rate variable and country-specific variables to the equation.
Other investigations relying on the Taylor rule to specify the latent variable are found in
Dueker (1999) and Dolado et al. (2005).
For the influence of the variables on an interest rate step taken by the central bank, we
expect the following behaviour. A higher inflation rate should lead to a higher probability
for an interest rate increase, as well as a higher output gap or a related measure. In both
cases, there is either direct or indirect danger to the goal of price stability pursued by
the central bank besides the aim of output stabilisation. Also, a higher money growth
rate should lead to a higher target interest rate because, in the long run, inflation does
not exist without the respective liquidity in the economy. A positive growth rate of the
exchange rate means an appreciation of the Euro vis-a`-vis the rest of the world. This
would reduce the risk of inflation and the probability of an interest rate cut would rise.
With the lagged change of the target interest rate included in the estimation equation,
interest rate smoothing is incorporated in the explanation. If the central bank is averse to
abrupt changes in the interest rates and averse to contradicting its decisions, one would
expect a positive sign for this variable. In the first case, the central bank distributes
necessary changes of the interest rate over several periods. There should also be a sequence
of interest rate changes in the same direction. The same outcome would be observed if
the central bank is reluctant to reverse its decisions. A negative sign would show that
the central bank is reluctant to change the policy rate again immediately after a change
(Gal´ı et al. 2004).
The interest rate itself will determine whether the level of the interest rate is appropriate
or needs to be adjusted. According to equation (5), we expect a negative sign for this
variable.
If the central bank’s decisions depend on country-specific variables, the same direction of
influence should be expected. If the inflation rate of a country plays a role, the probability
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of an interest rate cut should be higher, the lower this specific inflation rate. The same is
expected for the country-specific output gap or a related measure. If the actual production
exceeds the potential production, the central bank should more likely increase the interest
rate to counter the resulting inflationary pressure.
The dependent variable is the interest rate of the main refinancing operations (MRO).
Because the Governing Council of the ECB decides about the policy rate once a month,
we get a monthly time series. The rate change will be effective in the auction following
the decisions of the policy-maker. Because of this, there are two critical dates: April
2000 and August 2000. Because both decisions are taken at the end of the month, the
changes become effective in the next month. Nevertheless, the decision was taken at that
respective date, and we, therefore, decide to attribute the policy rate changes to April
and August 2000.
Monthly time series are used for estimation, consisting of economic sentiment indicator
and the inflation rate for the individual countries of the EMU (Germany, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Austria, Finland)
and the euro area. The series for the inflation rates are based on the Consumer Prices
Index (Source: Eurostat), which were seasonally adjusted with Census X11. The series
of the economic sentiment indicator used as an alternative for the output gap follows
the specification of Gerlach (2004). It is derived from the economic sentiment series of
the European Commission, following 100(esit − esi)/esi, where esi is the mean of the
respective series.
For the euro area, the annual growth rate of M3, the policy rate of the ECB and the
annual growth rate of the real exchange rate are incorporated. For money growth, the
three month moving average of the annual growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3 is
used (Source: ECB). The annual growth rate of the exchange rates bases on the series
of the real CPI effective exchange rate index of the euro zone (EER-42, Source: ECB).
All time series cover the period from January 1999 to March 2005, albeit with the Greek
series starting in January 2001.
5 Estimation Results
The starting point for the investigation of country-specific influences on the interest rate
decision of the ECB should be a well-specified Taylor rule. We rely on the specification of
11
Gerlach (2004) and include the inflation rate, the economic sentiment indicator, and the
three month moving average of money growth M3 into the basic equation. Additionally,
we employ the growth rate of the real exchange rate. To capture interest rate smoothing,
we include the level as well as the change of the policy rate (Gal´ı, Gerlach, Rotemberg,
Uhlig, and Woodford 2004). All explanatory variables enter the equation with a lag of one
month due to availability of the data at the time of decision-making by the ECB Council.
The estimation results seem to be reasonable: all explanatory variables enter the equation
significantly at least at the ten percent level and with the expected sign (see Table 1, model
(1)). The only exception is the inflation rate. This could be due to the fact, that the
central bank’s behaviour is forward-looking. This behaviour could not be captured by
the lagged inflation rate. A higher economic sentiment and money growth would reduce
the probability of an interest rate cut and lead to a higher probability of an interest rate
increase. A higher policy rate in the last period would lead to a higher probability of an
interest rate cut. A higher change in the policy rate in the last period would lead to the
same reaction, and the central bank would probably not raise the interest rate further. As
expected, a higher growth rate of the real exchange rate would lead to a higher probability
of an interest rate decrease.
The dominance of certain countries or the economic situation in certain countries in the
decision-making of the ECB Governing Council would appear in the estimation equation
through a significant influence of country-specific variables. Since we do not have a suffi-
cient number of observations, which would have enabled us to include all country-specific
variables at the same time and get a reliable estimation, we proceed as follows. First,
we estimate two equations, one with the basic specification extended by the respective
differences between inflation rates of the EMU members and the area-wide inflation rate.
The values of the Greek series differ from zero from January 2001 onwards. The sec-
ond equation includes the differences between the sentiment indicators of the respective
countries and that of the euro area.
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Ordered Probit Taylor rule
adjusted sample 1999:03 - 2005:12
82 observations
Model (1) Model (2)
Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat.
it−1 −0.89∗∗ -2.15 −4.97∗∗ -2.46
Δit−1 −3.59∗∗ -2.20 −9.47∗∗∗ -2.64
πt−1 0.83 1.46 3.00∗∗ 2.12
esit−1 0.26∗∗∗ 2.97 0.36∗∗ 2.15
Δmt−1 0.93∗∗ 2.44 1.13 1.58
Δet−1 −0.14∗∗ -2.26 −0.42∗∗ -2.47
πt−1 − πt−1 1.76∗ 1.91
πt−1 − πt−1 1.60 1.22
esit−1 − esit−1 −0.29 -1.63
esit−1 − esit−1 0.32∗∗∗ 2.40
μ1 2.11 0.52 −9.72 -1.35
μ2 7.44
∗∗ 2.11 1.01 0.16
Log likelihood -25.95 -15.78
Restr. log likelihood -51.56 -51.56
LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.4967 0.6940
Table 1: Estimation results for the county-specific influence on the interest rate decisions of
the ECB.
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Ordered Probit Taylor rule
adjusted sample 1999:03 - 2005:12
82 observations
Model (3): Model (4):
x = inflation x = economic sentiment
Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat.
it−1 −13.06∗∗ -2.44 −6.08∗ -1.67
Δit−1 −20.74 -1.64 −9.75∗ -1.65
πt−1 3.58 1.25 8.74 1.42
esit−1 0.19 0.69 1.29∗ 1.68
Δmt−1 1.36 0.81 3.64 1.45
Δet−1 −1.04∗∗ -2.38 0.07 0.28
xAUt−1 − xt−1 8.03∗ 1.81 0.19 1.21
xBEt−1 − xt−1 −3.97 -1.21 −1.03∗ -1.69
xDEt−1 − xt−1 −1.56 -0.52 −0.85 -0.49
xFIt−1 − xt−1 4.48 1.58 0.17 0.85
xFRt−1 − xt−1 −3.64 -0.99 0.23 0.36
xGRt−1 − xt−1 −1.42 -0.98 0.04 0.30
xIRt−1 − xt−1 2.47 1.55 0.38 1.37
xITt−1 − xt−1 0.73 0.33 −0.43 -0.70
xLXt−1 − xt−1 0.77 0.30 0.32∗ 1.80
xPTt−1 − xt−1 2.26 1.10 0.27 1.18
xNLt−1 − xt−1 −1.83 -0.75 0.67 1.55
xSPt−1 − xt−1 −4.14∗ -1.68 −0.22 -0.52
μ1 −35.53∗ -1.93 13.75 0.92
μ2 −14.31 -1.00 30.26 1.31
Log likelihood -12.11 -14.23
Restr. log likelihood -51.56 -51.56
LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.7652 0.7240
Table 2: Estimation results for the county-specific influence on the interest rate decisions of
the ECB.
The estimation containing the country-specific inflation differentials leads to the results
displayed in Table 2, model (3). Only the Austrian and the Spanish inflation differentials
appear to be significant. However, this renders the more traditional explanatory variables
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insignificant. Only the lagged interest rate and the exchange rate variable seem to be
still important for the interest rate decisions of the ECB. Nevertheless, the value of the
log-likelihood improves considerably.
The significant country-specific influences have the opposite sign. This could hint to a
problem of multicollinearity. To assess how severe this problem is in the actual setting,
we analyse the correlation coefficients of the series (see appendix, Table 7). As we can see,
we have some stronger correlation, especially between Finland and Ireland and between
Portugal and the Netherlands with correlation coefficients higher than 0.7. The case for
multicollinearity is supported if the independent variables are regressed on each other and
the resulting R
2
is regarded (see appendix, Table 5). This does not matter for prediction,
but for identifying country-specific influence this poses a severe problem.
The second equation contains the difference between the country-specific sentiment indi-
cators and the euro area indicator (see Table 2, model (4)). Again, we have two significant
country-specific influences, that of Belgium and of Luxembourg, with the opposite sign.
However, the correlations between the sentiment gaps do not exceed the threshold of 0.7
(see appendix, Table 8). But the R
2
statistics of the auxiliary regressions show high values
(see appendix, Table 6). Unfortunately, the detection of multicollinearity does not help to
reduce the number of explanatory variables appropriately and to find the variables that
are crucial for the model.
One approach to reduce the number of explanatory variable is based on the following
reflections. We do not expect that all countries of the euro area influence the interest
rate decisions of the ECB. Rather, there are two different possibilities. The first is that
countries with high political weight indeed influence the decisions depending on their
economic situation. This we could not detect because of the similarities in the development
of the inflation rates and sentiment indicators. The second possibility does not depend
on the political weight, but on the economic situation in the euro area. It is imaginable
that the highest and/or lowest country-specific inflation rates and output gaps influence
the interest rate decisions. This would imply, that the ECB looks at country-specific
developments but not at the same country for every decision. The decisions would be
distorted in the direction of extreme developments. If the latter assumption is true,
an influence of potential EMU members on the decisions could be expected in the future
because they have higher inflation rates and growth rates than present members, at least at
the moment. This situation should change until the countries join the EMU. In particular,
15
a convergence of inflation rates could be expected because low inflation rates are part of
the convergence criteria determining the enlargement decision.
To test the assumption that not a country per se influences the decisions, but that central
bankers are rather concerned with the extreme economic developments in the euro area,
we built two artificial time series consisting of the minimum and the maximum of the
country-specific inflation rates or economic sentiment indicators at every month. Greek
time series are included beginning in 2001. Comparing the resulting series to that of
the euro area, we see that the inflation rate of the euro area is more closely following
the minimum of the country-specific inflation rates. The same is true for the economic
sentiment indicator (see Figure 2). But for the inflation rate, a change in behaviour could
be detected at the end of the sample, where the inflation rate of the euro area seems to
be adjusting to the behaviour of the maximum inflation rate.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Inflation rate euro area
M axim um  inflation rate
M inim um  inflation rate
pe
rc
e
n
t
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Econom ic sentim ent euro area
M axim um  econom ic sentim ent
M inim um  econom ic sentim ent
pe
rc
e
n
t
Figure 2: Minimum and Maximum of the inflation rates (left figure) and the economic sentiment
indicator (right figure).
These series are used in the estimation (see Table 1, model (2)). As a result, the series for
the minimum economic sentiment and the maximum inflation rate appear to significantly
influence the decisions of the ECB. The inflation rate is now significant at the 5 percent
level. But money growth does not seem to influence the ECB decisions any longer. The
value of the log-likelihood improves. Even the maximum economic sentiment is barely
significant at the 10 percent level (p-value of 0.1040). The opposite sign of the two
sentiment series is puzzling. On the one hand, the wider the gap between the maximum
economic sentiment indicator, the higher is the probability of an interest rate cut. This
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would lead to expansionary monetary policy that does not counter possible inflationary
pressure coming from the real economy. For the minimum indicator, the coefficient shows
the expected sign. The smaller the gap between the minimum economic sentiment and
the euro-wide value, the lower is the probability of an interest rate cut. The danger of a
rising inflation pressure is taken into account, and monetary policy is rather restrictive.
For the inflation rate, only the maximum values seem to matter. A change of the dispersion
of inflation measured by the distance between the euro wide price development and the
extreme values displayed by country-specific developments, seems only to play a role for
inflation rates higher than the euro wide average. In this case, a higher maximum inflation
rate compared to the euro-wide level would lead to a higher probability of an increasing
interest rate. This would support the view that the definition of price stability by the
ECB is asymmetric: there seems to be a distortion in the sense that inflation plays a
bigger role than the danger of deflation.
There is an important difference between the formation of the time series displaying the
extreme economic development of the euro area. Inflation rates are highly persistent, and,
therefore, certain countries deliver the values of the respective series for prolonged time.
For maximum inflation, Ireland had the highest inflation rates most of the sample period,
followed by Greece and Spain for shorter time periods. For the minimum inflation, we
have Finland as the country with the lowest inflation in the euro area for a considerable
time span, followed by France, Germany, and Belgium with much shorter time spans. This
could induce the assumption that country-specific inflation rates influence the decision-
making of the ECB. For the economic sentiment, the countries delivering the extreme
values change much more frequently. Worth mentioning are Greece, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Portugal, which display the lowest values of the economic sentiment,
each for some time.
The prediction of policy rate changes improves with the inclusion of country-specific influ-
ences compared to model (1), as the numbers in Table 3 show. The models with country-
specific influence are less prone to error with respect to predicting interest rate changes,
where the interest rate stayed the same. All models make some errors in predicting the
timing of increasing interest rates in 2002. The basic model and the model containing
the extreme developments, model (2), are better in explaining the interest rate increases
than interest rate cuts. The interest rate cuts are better captured by models including
country-specific developments. The best model in this respect is the model containing
the inflation differentials, model (3). All interest rate cuts are hit at the right moment.
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This supports the view that the decisions of the ECB are taken with respect to the de-
velopments in the whole euro area, and not with respect to selected countries. The only
convincing influence can be detected for the dispersion of the developments measured by
the maximum inflation and minimum sentiment values. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the
extreme developments does not provide the same fit as the country-specific values. This
is not surprising, because the minimum and maximum values cannot provide the same
information as the individual series. However, the maximum and the minimum seem to
provide an essential part of the information contained in the country-specific series.
Count with maximum probability
Count of Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Interest rate observations
- decrease 8 3 6 8 7
- unchanged 66 62 62 64 63
- increase 8 4 7 6 6
Table 3: Prediction table for ordered dependent variable taking the timing of the interest rate
changes into account.
To assign the magnitude of influence of the explanatory variables, we determine the
marginal probabilities at the mean. The marginal probabilities do not add to zero for some
of the variables because of rounding errors. First of all, the influence of all explanatory
variables is rather small. This is especially true for the original model, but even more so
for the extended model.1 For model (2), a change of the mean of an explanatory variable
has virtually no effect on the probabilities of a changing or an unchanged interest rate.
In the basic model, the influences of the lagged interest rate and the inflation rate are
comparable but point in opposite directions. The impact of money growth on the proba-
bilities is higher, but still of the same magnitude. A lower influence has a change of the
mean of the economic sentiment indicator. The highest impact on the probabilities of an
(un)changed policy rate has the change of the interest rate last month. In the extended
model, the change of the probability of an interest rate change is near zero. The change
of the mean of one of the explanatory variables would almost have no influence on the
respective probabilities. This leads to the conclusion that the explanatory variables are
important but their influence is small. However, there seems to be no dominant influence
of one of the independent variables.
1For Model (1), the effects are of the same magnitude as Greene (2000, p. 879).
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Model (1) Model (2)
Marginal probability
decrease unchanged increase decrease unchanged increase
i 0.014 -0.007 -0.007 0.0000036 -0.0000033 -0.0000003
Δi 0.058 -0.028 -0.029 0.0000069 -0.0000063 -0.0000006
π -0.013 0.006 0.007 -0.0000022 0.0000020 0.0000002
esi -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.0000003 0.0000002 0.0000000
Δm -0.015 0.007 0.008 -0.0000008 0.0000007 0.0000001
Δe 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.0000003 -0.0000003 -0.0000000
π − π -0.0000013 0.0000012 0.0000001
π − π -0.0000012 0.0000011 0.0000001
esi− esi 0.0000002 -0.0000002 -0.0000000
esi− esi -0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000000
Table 4: The marginal probabilities of the basic equation and the equation including extreme
development variables.
With the future enlargement of the EMU, the economic situation in the European cur-
rency area will be even more heterogeneous. However, the countries acceding to the
monetary union will be of minor economic weight. Moreover, there will be a rotation
system introduced in the decision-making of the Governing Council of the ECB, where
the frequency of voting will depend on the economic weight of a country. The higher the
economic weight, the more frequent a governor of a country will have the opportunity
to vote. The economic weight depends on the share of the country with regard to the
GDP to market prices and the share of the aggregated balance sheet of monetary finan-
cial institutions. Since the future EMU members are relatively small in economic terms,
they will, for the most part, be situated in the third group and have a voting share of
3/(n − n/2 − 5), where n denotes the number of governors. With 22 governors in the
extended Council, this number would be 1/2 within the third group. This would lead to
a relatively low voting share, but would still be considerably more than the respective
economic weights of these countries, which together count for 6 percent of the GDP of
the EMU economy (Belke and Polleit 2003).
Because we could not detect a dominant influence of certain countries of the monetary
union in a convincing way, it seems to be unlikely that the new member states would
influence the decision-making of the ECB in an asymmetric way. The present analysis
shows that the inflation rates and economic sentiments of the countries are too similar
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Figure 3: The minimum and maximum economic sentiment indicator for the EMU12 and
extended for 9 new member states of the European Union.
to allocate interest rate decisions to the economic development in certain countries, in
addition to the explanatory variables of the euro area. If the convergence process of the
new EU members is sufficient to reach the same extent of economic synchronisation as the
old EMU members have, it is not likely that the new states would exert special influence
on the policy rate. This statement carries over to the minimum and maximum inflation
rates and economic sentiment. Because low inflation is one of the convergence criteria to
be fulfilled before joining the EMU, there seems to be no reason to expect a much different
situation for the then-enlarged monetary union compared to the situation today. For the
economic sentiment, the picture could be different. However, if we take a look at the
development of the maximum and minimum sentiment indicator for the countries of the
EMU and the respective series extended for the new members (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia), we see a similar
development for the minimum sentiment indicator (see Figure 3). The difference is more
marked for the maximum sentiment. Because we could only detect a significant influence
of the maximum indicator, this supports the view that the enlargement of the monetary
union should not generate a problem of country-specific influences on ECB decisions.
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6 Conclusion
With the enlargement of the EMU, the economic heterogeneity of the European currency
area increases. That could pose a problem for decision-making in the Governing Council
of the ECB with respect to policy rate decisions. The greater economic heterogeneity
would not be a problem if the governors and the board of directors only decide according
to area-wide variables. If a country-specific influence is detected, this contradicts the
task of the ECB. Moreover, the discussion regarding country-specific influence would be
encouraged. With this, the country of origin of the Council members matters and gives
room for political influence if a new governor or board member is appointed. As the
former analysis shows, there seem to be no dominant country-specific variables.
Even after the agreed reform of the ECB decision-making, it is not theoretically clear how
the representation of EMU members should be determined in the ECB Governing Council
(Berger and Mueller 2004). This issue assumes that national central bank governors base
at least part of their decision on regional economic development. In contrast to that
standpoint, the ECB stresses the point that regional developments do not play a role
in the interest rate decisions. Unfortunately, the transparency of the ECB, even if well-
founded to protect political independence, does not provide proof of the fact. There are no
minutes of the meetings or voting records available. Therefore, we try to detect country-
specific influences on interest rate decision by estimating a Taylor-type rule and including
time series of individual countries additionally to the common explanatory variables.
The detected influence of large inflation and sentiment differentials would probably carry
over to the enlarged Council, whereas a convincing dominant influence of a country-specific
influence could not be detected. However, for the time being, a more sophisticated analysis
of the potential country-specific influence does not seem possible, since we lack the relevant
data. If all present EMU countries had followed and all potential EMU members would
actually follow a monetary policy strategy similar to that of the ECB, a comparison of
the reaction functions of the central banks could give hints towards the future behaviour
of the monetary authorities. Since this is not the case, we have to close our analysis at
this point.
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Appendix
dependent variable R
2
i 0.97
Δi 0.37
π 0.85
esi 0.92
Δm 0.92
Δe 0.87
πAU − π 0.76
πBE − π 0.77
πDE − π 0.70
πFI − π 0.92
πFR − π 0.77
πGR − π 0.74
πIR − π 0.95
πIT − π 0.78
πLX − π 0.66
πPT − π 0.85
πNL − π 0.91
πSP − π 0.56
Table 5: Adjusted R2 for the auxil-
iary regression of the dependent vari-
able on all other explanatory variables
in the main regression.
dependent variable R
2
i 0.89
Δi 0.31
π 0.72
esi 0.98
Δm 0.84
Δe 0.88
esiAU − esi 0.49
esiBE − esi 0.74
esiDE − esi 0.93
esiFI − esi 0.84
esiFR − esi 0.91
esiGR − esi 0.49
esiIR − esi 0.49
esiIT − esi 0.91
esiLX − esi 0.51
esiPT − esi 0.66
esiNL − esi 0.81
esiSP − esi 0.87
Table 6: Adjusted R2 for the auxil-
iary regression of the dependent vari-
able on all other explanatory variables
in the main regression.
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